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Driven by innovation, science and tech-
nology are continually evolving. Over the
past several years, the global scientific
community and the world have had the
opportunity to see firsthand the signif-
icant strides that have been made in
the area of life science research, and the
corresponding ethical, safety, and secu-
rity questions that arise as a result of
this work. The idea that well-intended
research could be used for nefarious pur-
poses is not new. The “dual-use” poten-
tial of advancing technologies has dri-
ven the dialog in a variety of sectors,
including biological, chemical, and nuclear.
In Canada, the Public Health Agency of
Canada (PHAC) administers the Human
Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), the
principle legislative tool overseeing the
biosafety and biosecurity of activities
involving human pathogens and toxins in
Canada.
The HPTA currently requires all per-
sons conducting controlled activities (pos-
sessing, handling, using, producing, stor-
ing, permitting access to, transferring,
importing, exporting, releasing, or other-
wise abandoning) with human pathogens
and toxins to take all reasonable precau-
tions to protect the health and safety of
the public. Proposed regulations (Human
Pathogens and Toxins Regulations – HPTR)
to support full implementation of the
HPTA (in 2015) were published online
for public consultation until September 4,
2014 (http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/
2014/2014-06-21/html/reg2-eng.php) and
will be made final over the coming year.
The HPTA framework has been developed
through extensive consultation with regu-
lated parties in order to keep the public safe
and secure, while not inhibiting responsi-
ble scientific innovation and critical out-
break response activities. The key elements
of the proposed framework are outlined
here.
A PROPOSED LICENSING REGIME
Socially responsible scientific innovation
requires that the research community feels
responsible for the outcomes of their
research. Internationally, there are numer-
ous approaches to establishing national
biosafety and biosecurity accountability
systems. The licensing regime that is pro-
posed under the HPTA framework would
marry these two perspectives by provid-
ing greater freedom to internally assess and
manage risks with a corresponding increase
in accountability for safe and responsible
practices.
Under the proposed HPTR, a licens-
ing scheme would be established for facil-
ities conducting controlled activities with
human pathogens and toxins. This risk-
based scheme would impose more strin-
gent biosafety and biosecurity require-
ments based on the inherent risks of the
agents being handled and the nature of the
activities being undertaken. Five elements
of the proposed HPTA framework that are
particularly relevant for the oversight of
research with the potential for dual use
and would be facilitated under the licensing
scheme are as follows.
ENHANCING INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY
SYSTEMS
Certain stakeholder populations have risk
management and oversight practices in
place to support core business functions,
such as quality control of their products,
which also mitigate many biosafety risks. In
other populations, institutional oversight
can be highly variable. The proposed HPTR
would require facilities conducting scien-
tific research to submit information on
how their facility administratively man-
ages and controls biosafety and biosecu-
rity risks, including information on roles
and responsibilities of key biosafety per-
sonnel or committees. This is intended
to enhance local oversight over pathogen
research, the foundation of a “systemic”
safety regime.
BIOLOGICAL SAFETY OFFICERS
Under an HPTA license, a qualified biolog-
ical safety officer (BSO) would be desig-
nated for each institution (licensed entity)
and this individual would have a number
of duties and powers, including
• Verifying the accuracy and completeness
of license applications.
• Communicating with PHAC on behalf
of the institution as appropriate and
necessary.
• Promoting and monitoring compliance.
• Assisting in the development and main-
tenance of the institution’s standard
operating procedures related to biosafety
and biosecurity and their biosafety man-
ual.
• Assisting in internal investigations.
• Accessing all records necessary to carry
out their functions.
The BSO would be a powerful resource
for both the license-holder and PHAC
to help oversee biosafety and biosecurity
within an institution.
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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR “SECURITY
SENSITIVE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS (SSBAS)”
The proposed HPTR would establish
a prescribed list of pathogens, includ-
ing a subset of Risk Group 3 or 4
pathogens and prescribed toxins that are
on the Australia Group common con-
trols list (http://www.australiagroup.net/
en/human_animal_pathogens.html). The
proposed framework would require anyone
with access to SSBAs to receive a security
clearance, unless accompanied and super-
vised or exempted under the HPTR. Work
with SSBAs would also be subject to addi-
tional biosafety and biosecurity require-
ments in the Canadian Biosafety Standard.
“GAIN OF FUNCTION” REPORTING
The proposed HPTA framework would
support institutional risk management by
requiring notification for experiments that
will increase the risks posed by a pathogen
(e.g., increased pathogenicity or virulence).
REPORTING EVENTS OF PUBLIC HEALTH
SIGNIFICANCE
The proposed HPTA framework would
further require that license holders notify
PHAC of events (incidents, accidents)
involving human pathogens or toxins that
have the potential to put the public at risk.
This includes inadvertent release, inadver-
tent production (e.g., through synthetic
biology), inadvertent possession, missing
or stolen pathogens or toxins, and any
exposure that has or may have caused dis-
ease. These reporting requirements allow
PHAC to assist in investigations, iden-
tify biosafety and biosecurity issues, and
follow-up on potential issues of public
health concern. Most of these events will
not require direct action on behalf of
the agency, but will assist in the ongoing
and open dialog between regulators and
stakeholders.
A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO
BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY
While the proposed framework provides
a range of compliance monitoring, ver-
ification, and enforcement tools, PHAC
focuses heavily on compliance promotion.
Through extensive outreach and engage-
ment, PHAC provides opportunities for
open communication between researchers
and regulators, enhancing overall biosafety
and biosecurity. For example:
• Onsite compliance promotion inspec-
tions, which provide an opportu-
nity for stakeholders to ask questions,
receive input and recommendations for
improvements, and gain confidence in
their biosafety program.
• Promoting collaborative biosafety envi-
ronments, for example, by assisting in
the establishment of a Canadian Uni-
versity BSO Network and supporting
conferences on Biosafety.
• Maintaining an active presence in the
biosafety community, for example, at
conferences, competitions (e.g., interna-
tional Genetically Engineered Machines
competition), and within academic
institutions (e.g., assisting institutional
biosafety committees).
• Stakeholder engagement in the devel-
opment of the HPTA framework
through consultations and expert work-
ing groups. In addition, an external
Advisory Committee will be established
under the HPTA to advise on the risks
associate with human pathogens and
toxins.
• Online training through the PHAC
learning portal on topics such as
biosafety principles, risk assessment, and
dual use (http://www.publichealth.gc.
ca/training).
• Pathogen Safety Data Sheets that
describe the hazardous properties
of a human pathogen and rec-
ommendations for work involving
these agents in a laboratory setting
(http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/lab-bio/
res/psds-ftss/index-eng.php).
• Assisting with local risk assessments,
site-specific risk assessments that con-
sider not only the pathogen but also the
specific activity being undertaken.
• Publishing Biosafety Advisories, Noti-
fications, and Directives that com-
municate critical biosafety informa-
tion to stakeholders, such as the
recently updated advisory on influenza
A/H7N9 (http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/
lab-bio/res/index-eng.php).
• Comprehensive standards and robust
guidelines to help stakeholders under-
stand the biosafety and biosecu-
rity requirements for working with
pathogens and toxins (http://canadian
biosafetystandards.collaboration.gc.ca/
index-eng.php).
PHAC has initiated a dialog with other
Federal departments and agencies that
have an interest in emerging life sci-
ences and dual-use research. Together,
we are examining where programs are
robust, and where there are opportuni-
ties to improve oversight at all levels:
among federal regulators, manufacturers,
and distributors of enabling technologies,
industry, researcher, the public, and any-
one else with a stake in this complex
issue. These conversations are happening
in parallel around the world, providing fur-
ther opportunities to look at the global
context.
ESTABLISHING A CULTURE OF
RESPONSIBILITY
PLANNING FOR SUCCESS
For years, researchers have been trying to
understand whether and how influenza
A/H5N1 could become human-to-human
transmissible by aerosols. A wide variety
of approaches have been employed, but it
was only when Drs. Kawaoka and Fouch-
ier obtained relative success (1, 2) that
the international community engaged in
heated debate.
In 2006, when the National Insti-
tutes of Health recommended research
on influenza viruses, including influenza
virus transmission [National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID);
(3)], there was an opportunity to initi-
ate a dialog on the possible risks of such
research. Had the international scientific
community started to discuss the possible
dual-use implications of actually succeed-
ing in creating a mammalian transmissible
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in
the laboratory, at the very least, we would
have been more prepared when it occurred
in 2011 (1, 2). These and other examples tell
us that, in the global arena, we have a way
to go in planning for success from the per-
spective of biosafety and biosecurity, which
may include early involvement of regula-
tors and oversight bodies in the planning
stages. As science and technology continue
to advance, the challenges associated with
“planning for success” will increase expo-
nentially, and policy makers will need to
determine how to adjust, for example, to
a reality where one can create an entire
biological system that has never been seen
before.
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A CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY
In a 2011 report on strengthening the
culture of responsibility in the context
of biosecurity [National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB); (4)], the
NSABB writes that “knowledge is rarely, if
ever, neutral.” Information of almost any
type can be used for both positive and neg-
ative applications and thus, determining
what knowledge presents the greatest risk
for dual use is not only difficult but also
highly subjective. Within the realm of life
sciences research, external bodies, such as
federal regulators, can play an important
role in education and enforcing account-
ability. A culture of responsibility, however,
cannot be legislated, but it can be culti-
vated. In this scenario, everyone with an
interest in the great potential benefits and
possible risks associated with cutting edge
life sciences research has a role to play.
The NSABB report (4) details the role
researchers have in understanding the pos-
sible implications and applications of their
work, in championing good research prac-
tices, and in taking ownership of their
own responsibility by holding themselves
and their peers accountable. This philos-
ophy could equally be extended beyond
researchers to the wider community: to
institutions, to the manufacturers and dis-
tributors of enabling technologies, to pro-
fessional associations, and even to civil
society and the public.
Social responsibility is much larger than
individual researchers. It is widely accepted
that working in silos is disruptive to insti-
tutional alignment and collaboration. Silo
mentality has added disadvantage of dif-
fusing safety, security, and ethical practices,
leading to redundancies and possible gaps.
There is a significant advantage to system-
izing safety and security practices – increas-
ing both the responsibility and the account-
ability of institutions for the oversight and
the outcomes of the research done within.
In Canada, the proposed framework would
place responsibility on research institutions
for administrative oversight, permitting
a tailored approach to risk management
to suit the unique research environment.
Establishing biosafety and biosecurity pro-
grams such that risk management occurs in
a collaborative and integrated environment
is expected to increase the likelihood that
the necessary conversations take place long
before research with potential for dual use
is underway. This would then inform the
wider dialog on the ethics, safety, and secu-
rity issues related to emerging biological
sciences.
RISK–BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In recent examples of research with the
potential for dual use, international dis-
cussions focused on the risks of publica-
tion, with less emphasis on the need for
systematic, scientific, evidence-based risk–
benefit analysis in such research (5, 6).
In the absence of concrete data, as is the
case with emerging technologies, this risk–
benefit analysis may be largely hypothet-
ical. The risks of potential misuse (acci-
dental or intentional) are weighed against
the assumed potential benefits of scientific
innovation. Within the scientific commu-
nity, there is growing debate over the lat-
ter with respect to “gain-of-function” flu
research. On October 16, 2013, a letter
was sent to the President of the Euro-
pean Commission on behalf of the Euro-
pean Society for Virology (ESV), caution-
ing against prohibiting dual-use research
because of the potential benefits (7). Two
months later, a letter in response to the
ESV appeal was sent to President Barroso
on behalf of the Foundation for Vaccine
Research, challenging many of the reputed
benefits (8).
This underscores the need to take a crit-
ical look at the real benefits of research
with potential for dual use and, in some
way, measure them against the real risks.
This will be very difficult as, in almost all
cases, the “real” risks and benefits have not
yet been realized, and there may be signif-
icant division within the scientific com-
munity on both counts. This is perhaps
the area of discussion in which it is most
important to involve all sectors, including
the public, as “risk” and “benefit” are both
highly influenced by perception. A quali-
tative risk–benefit analysis framework for
assessing research with dual-use potential,
if possible, would be the most decisive tool
for asking the hardest and most important
questions we currently face: “what happens
if we do not do this research”but also“what
happens if we do.”
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